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Abstract1 
This paper inverts the usual logic of applied optimal income taxation. It starts from the observed 
distribution of income before and after redistribution and corresponding marginal tax rates. Under a 
set of simplifying assumptions, it is then possible to recover the social welfare function that would 
make the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal. In this framework, the issue of the optimality 
of an existing tax-benefit system is transformed into the issue of the shape of the social welfare 
function associated with that system and whether it satisfies elementary properties. This method is 
applied to the French redistribution system with the interesting implication that the French 
redistribution authority may appear, under some plausible scenario concerning the size of the labor 
supply behavioral reactions, non Paretian (e.g. giving negative marginal social weights to the richest 
class of tax payers). 
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Introduction 
Several attempts were recently made at analyzing existing redistribution systems in several 
countries within the framework of optimal income taxation theory. The basic question asked in that 
literature is whether it is possible to justify the most salient features of existing systems by some 
optimal tax argument. For instance, under what condition would it be optimal for the marginal tax 
rate curve to be U-shaped [see Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) for the US and Salanié (1998) for 
France]? Or could it be optimal to have 100 per cent effective marginal tax rates at the bottom of 
the distribution as implied by some minimum income programs [see Piketty (1997), d'Autume 
(2001), Choné and Laroque (2005) and Bourguignon and Spadaro (2000) in the case of France and 
other European countries]? Such questions were already addressed in the early optimal taxation 
literature and in particular in Mirrlees (1971) on the basis of arbitrary parametric representations of 
the distribution of individual abilities. The exercise may seem more relevant now because of the 
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possibility of relying on large and well documented micro data sets giving some indication on the 
'true' distribution of abilities.  
The results obtained when applying the standard optimal taxation calculation to actual data depend 
very much on several key ingredients of the model. The shape of the social welfare function may be 
the most important one.  As already pointed out by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) in their comments 
of Mirrlees' original work, using a Rawlsian social objective or a utilitarian framework on a 
hypothetical distribution of abilities meant to approximate real world distributions makes a big 
difference. The first would lead to very high effective marginal rates for low individual abilities, 
whereas the second would be closer to a linear tax system, with a constant marginal tax rate. As the 
sensitivity with estimated distribution of abilities is likely to yield the same range of results, what 
should one conclude? Should one refer to a Rawlsian objective and conclude that some part of 
observed redistribution systems are clearly sub-optimal, or should one use a less extreme 
assumption for the social welfare function and then conclude that another part of the redistribution 
schedule in non-optimal?   
The approach in this paper is the opposite of this standard approach. The focus is on the social 
welfare function that makes optimal the actual marginal tax rate schedule that corresponds to the 
redistribution system actually in place. This approach may thus be considered as the dual of the 
previous one. In the standard approach, wondering about the optimality of an actual redistribution 
system consists of comparing an optimal effective marginal tax rate schedule derived from some 
'reasonable' social welfare function with the actual one. In the present case, it consists of checking 
whether the social welfare function implied by the actual redistribution schedule is in some sense 
'reasonable', and in particular whether the marginal social welfare is everywhere decreasing 
(ensuring the concavity of the social objective) and positive. If the first condition does not hold, 
then it is the whole optimization concept behind Mirrlees’ framework that would become doubtful. 
It would indeed be very difficult to assume that the redistribution authority attempts to maximize a 
non-concave welfare function if other than trivial redistributions policies are observed.  If, on the 
contrary, the second condition fails, then the revealed social welfare function may not be deemed to 
be Paretian. 
The method proposed here provides a kind of new 'reading' of the effective average and marginal 
tax curves that are commonly used to describe a redistribution system. It translates the observed 
shape of these curves into a social welfare function. Comparing two redistribution systems is cast in 
terms of the social welfare which would make them optimal. Instead of analyzing who is getting 
more out of redistribution and who is getting less, or the way work incentives are distorted, the 
marginal tax rate schedule can be made to inform directly on the differential implicit marginal 
social welfare weight given to one part of the distribution versus another.  
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These 'revealed social preferences' necessarily rely on auxiliary assumptions about labor supply 
behavior and the distribution of individual abilities. With the direct or standard approach to optimal 
taxation, the optimal tax schedule is known to be very sensitive to these assumptions. The same is 
true of the social preferences revealed by a given marginal tax schedule. If revealed preferences are 
really odd, this may be because some common assumptions on labor supply behavior or on the 
distribution of abilities are inconsistent, which should be equally useful information.  
To our knowledge, this paper represents the first attempts to 'reveal' the implicit social welfare 
preferences by applying an 'optimal inverse' technique to direct taxation, within the framework of 
Mirrlees' optimal labor income tax model. A similar approach has been used in the field of indirect 
taxation by Ahmad and Stern (1984). They apply the optimal inverse method to the indirect taxation 
system in India and conclude that tax authorities are not Paretian in the sense that some agents have 
a negative marginal weight in the revealed social welfare function. They then derive a set of tax 
reforms that are Pareto improving over the status quo situation. In a more recent theoretical paper, 
Choné and Laroque (2005) use the optimum inverse within Mirrlees' optimal direct redistribution 
framework but focus on the distribution of individual abilities rather than the social welfare 
function. More precisely they show that there always exists a distribution of abilities - conditional 
on individual labor supply behavior - that makes an observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal 
with a Rawlsian welfare function. However, they do not apply empirically their inversion method so 
that it is difficult to know how 'reasonable' would be the 'revealed' distribution of abilities under the 
assumption of Rawlsian social welfare. Unlike Laroque and Choné (2005), the present paper inverts 
the optimal taxation model with respect to social welfare rather than the distribution of abilities and 
provides an empirical application of this method.  
The Mirrlees approach builds on a labor supply model which only focuses on hours-of-work 
responses. A labor supply model, incorporating labor market participation responses as well as the 
choice of hours, may provide more realistic results in optimal income taxation, as first shown by 
Saez (2002).  Accordingly, the present paper also shows the results of the inversion of an optimal 
tax problem à la Saez (2002) in which extensive and intensive labor supply behaviors are explicitly 
taken into account. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 recalls the optimal taxation model and derives the key 
duality relationship between the effective marginal tax rate schedule and the marginal social welfare 
function in the simple case where individual preferences between consumption and leisure are 
assumed to be quasi-linear. The second section discusses the empirical implementation of the 
preceding principles. The third section applies them to France, taking advantage of the easy 
identification of marginal tax rate schedule with the EUROMOD model2. In each case, the social 
                                                 
2 See Sutherland (2001). 
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welfare function is characterized under a set of simple alternative assumptions about labor supply 
elasticities, which allow deriving the distribution of individual abilities from observed labor 
incomes. Section 4 extends the analysis to the case of non-zero income-elasticity of labor supply. 
Section 5 analyzes the case where labor supply is discrete (as in Saez 2002). Section 6 concludes.  
This paper is both methodological and factual. On the methodological side, it shows how the 
characteristics of any given redistribution system may be expressed in social welfare terms. On the 
factual side, the main lesson drawn from the practical applications handled in the paper is 
essentially that revealed social preferences satisfy the usual regularity assumption – positive and 
decreasing marginal social welfare – as long as the wage elasticity of labor supply is below some 
threshold. In the case of France, under some plausible assumption on the labor supply elasticity, the 
redistribution authority appears to be non Paretian (e.g. giving negative social weights to some class 
of tax payers). The inclusion of labor market participation responses as well as the choice of hours 
behaviors confirms that high marginal tax rates are compatible with the maximization of a Paretian 
social welfare function only if the labor supply elasticities are low.  
1.  The duality between optimal marginal tax rates and the social welfare function.   
The basic optimal taxation framework is well known.3 Agents are assumed to choose the 
consumption (c) /labor (L) combination that maximizes their preferences, U(c, L), given the budget 
constraint imposed by the government:  c = wL - T(wL), where w is the productivity, taken to also 
be the wage, of the agent and T( ) the net tax schedule. If the distribution of agents' productivity in a 
population of size unity is represented by the density function f(w) defined on the support [w0, Z], 
the optimal taxation problem may be written as:  
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where T  is the budget constraint of the government and G[.] is the function that transforms 
individual utility, V(.), into social welfare. Somewhat improperly, this function will be referred to as 
the 'social welfare function' in what follows. The main argument in this paper is based on the 
special case where the function U(c, L) is quasi-linear with respect to c and isoelastic with respect to 
                                                 
3 See for instance Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) or Tuomala (1990). 
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L, a case extensively used in both the theoretical and applied optimal tax literature4. Formally, the 
utility function writes: )(),( LBcLcU −=  with ε
ε
ε
ε +
+=
1
1
)( LLB  (2) 
where ε is the elasticity of labor supply, L*, with respect to the marginal return to labor. Together 
with (2) the solution of (1.2) above yields the labor supply function given by the solution of the 
following equation: [ ]εε *)('1* wLTwL −=  (3) 
It can be shown – see for instance Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) or Atkinson (1995) - that this 
particular case leads to the following simple characterization of the optimal tax schedule:  
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In that expression, t(y) is the (optimal) marginal tax rate faced by an agent with productivity, w, and 
therefore with (gross) earnings y=wL* -i.e. t(y) = T'(wL*).  F(w) and f(w) are respectively the 
cumulative and the density functions associated to the distribution of productivity in the population. 
Finally, S(w) stands for the average marginal social utility of all agents with productivity no smaller 
than w, which is given by:  
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where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint 1.4.  
The duality between the marginal rate of taxation and the social welfare function, which is exploited 
in the rest of this paper, lies in the two preceding relationships. It is thus important to have a good 
intuition of what they actually mean. Consider the following thought experiment. Starting from an 
arbitrary tax system, the government decides to increase the tax payment by a small increment dT 
for each agent whose labor income is equal or higher than Y and labor productivity equal or higher 
than W, leaving the rest of the tax schedule unchanged.  Such a measure has three effects: a) it 
reduces the labor supply of people with income in the neighborhood of Y because the marginal 
return to their labor falls by dT; b) it increases the tax payment of all people whose earnings is 
above Y by dT; c) it increases total tax receipts by the difference between effects b) and a).  With 
the optimal tax system, the total effect of these changes on social welfare must be equal to zero for 
all Y.  
The tax reduction effect a) depends on the marginal rate of taxation, t(Y), the elasticity of labor 
supply, ε, the productivity itself, W, and the density of people around that level of productivity, W. 
                                                 
4 See in particular Atkinson (1995) or Diamond (1998).    
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This tax reduction effect (TR) may be shown to be equal to5: dT
/11
)W(f.W
)Y(t1
)Y(tTR ε+−= . The tax 
increase effect (TI) is simply equal to the proportion of people above the productivity level W times 
the infra-marginal increase in their tax payment, dT: [ ]dTWFTI )(1−= . In order for the 
government’s budget constraint to keep holding, the resulting net increment in tax receipts, TI – TR, 
is to be redistributed. Since net effective marginal tax rates are not to be changed, except at Y, this 
requires redistributing a lump sum TI – TR to all individuals in the population. The marginal gain in 
social welfare of doing so is given by S(w0)(TI – TR).  The loss of social welfare comes from people 
above W whose disposable income is reduced by dT. People whose marginal tax rate is actually 
modified – i.e. people in the neighborhood of W – are not affected because they compensate the 
drop in the effective price of their labor and its negative effect on consumption by a reduction in the 
labor they supply and an increase in their leisure. This is the familiar envelope theorem. Under these 
conditions the loss of social welfare is simply equal to the proportion of people above W times their 
average social marginal welfare, S(W). The optimality condition may thus be written as: 
[ ] )()()()(1 0wSTRTIdTWSWF −=−  and after dividing through by S(w0) and dT: 
[ ]
dT
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)()(1
0
    (6),  
which, after rearranging, leads to (4) above.  
What is attractive in the preceding expression is that the right-hand side is essentially of a positive 
nature whereas the left-hand side is normative. The right hand side measures the net tax gain by 
Euro confiscated from people at and above W. The left hand side measures the relative marginal 
social loss of doing so. The preceding expression also exhibits the duality that is used in the rest of 
this paper. For a given distribution of productivities, f(w), the right-hand side may be easily 
evaluated by observing the tax-benefit system in a given economy and its implied effective 
marginal tax rate schedule, provided that some estimate of the labor supply elasticity is available. 
Then the left-hand side of (6) yields information on the social welfare function that is consistent 
with the observed tax-benefit system. When read in the reverse direction, (6) shows the tax-benefit 
system that is optimal for a given social welfare function. The latter is the usual approach in the 
applied optimal taxation literature. The former approach that ‘reveals’ the social welfare function 
                                                 
5 The change in the tax receipt is given by T'(Y).dY/dT g(Y), where g(Y) is the density of people at the gross labor 
income Y. Given (3), it is easily shown that dY/dT= εY/(1-T'(Y)) and that g(Y)= f(W).W/[Y.(1+ε)]. The expression of TR 
follows. 
 7
consistent with an existing tax-system, under the assumption that this system is indeed optimal in 
the sense of model (1) corresponds to the “optimum inverse method”6.  
Characterizing precisely the social welfare function, G[V(w)], implied by a tax-benefit system 
under the assumption that it is optimal requires some additional steps. Equations (4) or (6) can be 
simply rewritten as: 
)w(F1
)w(f.w
1)y(t1
)y(t1)w(S −+−−= ε
ε         (7) 
Identifying the marginal social welfare functions, G'(.), itself requires an additional step. 
Differentiating (7) and using the definition of S(w) in (5) yields: 
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where )(/)(')( wfwwfw =η  is the elasticity of the density and )(/)(')( ytyyty =ν  that of the 
marginal tax rates with respect to labor income y.  Putting (7) and (8) together, it can be seen that 
the function S(w), is the “upper average marginal social welfare” (UAMSW) of people with 
productivity equal or greater than w may thus be recovered from the knowledge of primary data, 
that is the marginal tax rate schedule, t(y) the elasticity ε and the distribution of abilities, i.e. f(w) 
and F(w).  Recovering G’(.) itself requires information on the derivatives of t(y) and f(w). Because 
of this, the estimate that can be empirically obtained of S(w) is likely to be much more robust than 
that of G’(.). Most of the empirical application in this paper will thus mostly be based on UAMSW 
rather than marginal welfare.   
All the previous results are based on the hypothesis that the observed marginal tax rate is the result 
of maximization of a social welfare function under the budget and the incentive compatibility 
constraints. This assumption imposes several restrictions on the shape of the observed marginal tax 
rate. If they are not satisfied, then the whole inversion procedure becomes inconsistent. In Appendix 
1 we analyze them in details. If one of the conditions in the appendix does not hold, then it is the 
whole optimization concept behind Mirrlees framework that would become doubtful. For instance, 
it would be difficult to assume that the redistribution authority attempts to maximize a non-concave 
welfare function if other than trivial redistribution policies are observed7. 
Let us now derive a few consequences of the optimal inverse framework for the Paretianity of the 
revealed social preferences  
                                                 
6 See, for instance, Kurz (1968). Going back to expression (4) above the optimum inverse problem considered in this 
paper consists of identifying S(w) given the knowledge of t(y), f(w) and ε. Choné and Laroque (2005) solve a symmetric 
problem by identifying the pair (f(w), ε)  knowing t(y) and S(w).  
7 Of course, from a mathematical point of view we cannot completely rule out a maximizing behavior. The point is that 
we are not able to characterize it. 
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Definition of Paretian Social Welfare Function: A SWF is sad to be Paretian if G’(V)≥ 0 
everywhere. It is Non Paretian otherwise. 
Proposition 1. A necessary condition for the social welfare function, G(.), that makes the observed 
effective marginal tax rate schedule, t(y), optimal with respect to the observed distribution of 
productivities, f(w)  to be Paretian is that: 
[ ]Zwwallfor
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   (9) 
The proof of that proposition is easily established. If the social welfare function is Paretian, the 
derivative of G(.) is positive everywhere and S(w), as defined by (5) too. Inequality (9) then follows 
from (7). This is only a necessary condition, but its interest is that it relies only on the knowledge of 
the marginal tax rate schedule and the distribution of productivities and should therefore be more 
robust that dealing directly with expression (8) of marginal social welfare.   
The Paretian condition given in proposition 1 can be also reinterpreted as a test on the relative 
position of the tax schedules with respect to the “Laffer bound”. This bound is defined as the 
revenue maximizing or efficiency cost minimizing tax system [see Canto, Joines and Laffer (1982) 
and Laroque (2005)], and it is precisely the right hand side of (9). If marginal tax rates are not 
below the Laffer bound, then observed the tax system can be optimal only with non Paretian social 
preferences. 
Interestingly, where the ability distribution f(w) may be approximated by a Pareto with parameter a, 
the preceding condition may be simply expressed as a ceiling on the marginal tax rate. Given that 
a
)w(F1
)w(f.w =− , (9) is equivalent to: ayt ++
+≤ ε
ε
/11
/11)(     (10) 
For instance, with not unreasonable values like a = 3 and ε =0.5, this condition states that a 
redistribution system where the effective marginal tax rate would exceed 50 per cent could be 
deemed 'optimal' only on the basis of a non-Paretian social welfare function.  
Proposition 2. If the elasticity of the marginal tax rate and the density function are bounded, then 
there exists a threshold for the wage elasticity of labor supply below which the social welfare 
function, G(.), is necessarily non-decreasing everywhere.  
This proposition follows directly from (8). If indeed )(wη and )( yν take only finite values, the 
second term on the RHS of (8) can be made as small as desired in absolute value by allowing ε to 
tend towards zero. Thus there always exists a value of ε small enough so that marginal social 
welfare is positive for all values of w. This property shows the importance of the assumption made 
on the wage sensitivity of labor supply to judge the optimality of a given redistribution system. Any 
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redistribution system may be said to optimize a Paretian social welfare function, provided that the 
redistribution authority has a low enough estimate of the wage elasticity of labor supply.  
Proposition 3. Wherever the marginal tax rate is increasing with income and the density of the 
ability distribution is decreasing, a sufficient condition for the social welfare function G(.) to be 
locally non-decreasing is: εη
ε
)(1
1)(
w
yt −
+≤    (11) 
Again, this proposition is directly derived from (8). It is of relevance in connection with the 
discussion on whether the marginal tax rate curve must be U-shaped – see Diamond (1998) and 
Saez (2001). In that part where the marginal tax rate is increasing, that is for high incomes, (11) 
gives an upper limit for the marginal tax rate – in the reasonable case where )w(η  is negative of 
course. It can be checked that this condition is the same as (10) in the case where the productivity 
distribution may be approximated by a Pareto. On the other hand, condition (11) becomes a 
necessary condition for marginal social welfare to be non-negative when the marginal tax rate is 
decreasing - for instance for low incomes.   
A last remark has to do with the well known results of the optimal income tax theory that the 
optimal marginal tax rate on the most productive agent must be zero when the support of f(w) is 
finite (Seade 1977, 1982) 8. As this is not observed in actual tax-benefit systems, there are two 
alternative interpretations: the first is to say that the tax-authority knows the highest wage rate but it 
is not pursuing the maximization of some well behaved social welfare function. The second is that 
tax authority is unable to identify the top wage and gives a non zero probability for the top wage to 
be above any arbitrary bound. In this second case, zero marginal taxation at the top becomes 
irrelevant. This second alternative is, in our opinion, the most plausible from an empirical point of 
view (as noted also by Atkinson 1985:57, Mirrlees 1976:340 and Diamond 1998). In what follows 
the support of f(w) is assumed to be large enough (with z tending to infinity). This is obtained by 
computing adaptive kernel densities for extreme high class of productivities or, as an alternative, by 
making the hypothesis that for the upper tails, the distribution follows a Pareto of parameter a.  
2. Empirical implementation issues 
The previous methodology requires estimates of the elasticity of labor supply, ε, the distribution 
f(w) and the marginal rate of taxation, t(y), to be available. Practically, what is observed in a typical 
household survey? Essentially total labor income, y=wL, and disposable income, c, or by 
difference, total taxes net of benefits, T(wL)9. When the household survey is connected with a full 
tax-benefit model, it is possible to compute the latter on the basis of the observed characteristics of 
                                                 
8 A simple proof of that property is obtained by considering the limiting case 1-F(w)=0 in the intuitive argument 
justifying (4) above. In that limiting case, optimization requires that TR=0, and therefore that t=0. 
9 To keep with the logic of the optimal taxation model, non-labor taxable income is ignored in all what follows. 
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the household and the official rule for the calculation of taxes and benefits. With such a model, it is 
also possible to evaluate the effective marginal tax rate by simulating the effects of changing 
observed labor income by a small amount. To be in the situation to apply the optimum inverse 
method analyzed above, it is thus necessary to impute a value of the productivity parameter, w, to 
the households being observed with total income Y and then to estimate the statistical distribution of 
individual productivities,  f(w). 
When labor supply, L, is observed, the simplest way to proceed would consist of assimilating 
productivity with observed hourly wage rates, and then using econometrically estimated values for 
the labor supply elasticity, ε, which, without loss of generality, might even be specified as a 
function of productivity, w (as it has been done in previous work on applied optimal income tax, see 
Diamond, 1998, Salanié, 1998, or d'Autume, 2001.  This is the first approach pursued below. 
Although simple, this approach can be inappropriate for several reasons. First, the distribution of 
hourly wages may be an imperfect proxy for the distribution of productivities because actual labor 
supply may differ quite significantly from observed working hours when unobserved efforts are 
taken into account.  Second, econometric estimates of the labor supply elasticity are extremely 
imprecise, and ambiguous. Econometric estimation requires taking into account the non-linearity 
inherent to most tax-benefit systems and the endogeneity of marginal tax rates that it entails. 
Moreover, econometric estimates derived from these non-linear models are known to be little robust 
(Blundell et al., 1998). On the other hand, relying on simpler alternative estimates based on 
standard linear specifications introduces some arbitrariness in the estimation procedure. Third, 
econometric estimates of the elasticity of labor supply, whether they are obtained from models with 
endogenous or exogenous marginal tax rates, are known to differ substantially across various types 
of individuals. In particular, it is small for household heads and larger for spouses, young people 
and people close to retirement age. Under these conditions, what value should be chosen? Fourth, 
and more fundamentally, it seems natural that a welfare analysis of taxes and benefits focus on 
households rather than individuals. But, then, the problem arises of aggregating at the household 
level concepts or measures that are valid essentially at the individual level. In particular, how 
should individual productivities be aggregated so as to define an “household productivity”? 
Likewise, if the elasticity of labor supply has been estimated at the individual level and is different 
across various types of individuals, how should it be averaged within the household?  
An alternative approach to the extremely complex econometric estimation procedure that would 
deal with the previous points is the following. Instead of assuming that observed hourly wages and 
hours of work are good proxies for individual productivities and labor supply, and deriving from 
them an estimate of labor supply elasticity, the whole procedure is inverted. An arbitrary value of 
the elasticity of labor supply is chosen within the range of values found in the literature. Then, this 
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value is used to derive the implicit productivity and labor supply of households or individuals from 
observed labor incomes.   
The latter operation is a simple inversion of the labor supply equation (3). Multiply both sides of 
that equation by w so that the gross labor income, Y, appears on the left hand side: 
εε *)](1.[.* 1 wLtwkwLY −== +      (12) 
After inversion, one gets for a given value of ε: 
ε
ε
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+ −= 11
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Thus, the implicit productivity, w, associated with observed gross labor income, Y, turns out to be 
an iso-elastic function of observed gross labor income corrected by a term that depends positively 
on the marginal tax rate. This correction is easily understood. For a given gross labor income, the 
higher the marginal tax rate, the lower is the labor supply as given by (3), and therefore the higher 
the implicit productivity. The preceding inversion procedure allows for a consistent definition of all 
the variables of which observation is necessary for recovering the social welfare function from the 
optimal taxation formula. Moreover, this procedure may be applied to individual agents as well as 
households comprising various potential earners. For household i, observed with gross labor 
income, Yi, and marginal tax rate, ti, a value of the implicit productivity characteristic, wi, may be 
imputed through (13). Then all households may be ranked by increasing value of that productivity. 
It is then possible to identify the distribution function F(w), the marginal tax rate function, t(Yi) and 
all the derivatives from which the social marginal welfare function may be inferred - see (7) and (8) 
above. Of course, from the household point of view, the elasticity of the household labor supply is 
not simply the average of the spouses’ elasticies. A more appropriate measure should take into 
account the activity status of the household components. For example, in the typical case of a one 
earner household in which the spouse is potentially active, the key labor supply parameter is the 
participation elasticity of the spouse. In the preceding framework, that extensive elasticity actually 
becomes the relevant household intensive labor supply elasticity.     
3.  Application to the French redistribution system 
As mentioned above, there is considerable imprecision about the value of labor supply elasticity, 
which moreover is likely to depend on individual characteristics like gender, age, marital status or 
household composition. A recent survey of estimation techniques and results obtained in studies of 
labor supply in UK and US by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Eissa and Hoynes (2006) give a 
range of values mostly concentrated in the interval [0-1]]. In the case of France, Bourguignon and 
Magnac (1991), Piketty (1998), Donni (2000), Bargain (2005), Choné et al. (2003) and Laroque and 
Salanié (2002) found labor supply elasticity estimates in the same interval.  Values between 0.1-0.2 
are found for men and an average of 0.5 is found for married women - and slightly more (0.6 to 1) if 
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they have children (Piketty 1998, Bargain, 2005, Choné et al. 2003). This second result is mainly 
driven by participation effects. Similar results have been obtained on the basis of the relationship 
between taxable incomes and changes in tax rates. In the case of France, Piketty (1999) found 
average elasticities of taxable income around 0.1 with participation elasticities around 0.2. In line 
with the empirical findings for France, we shall be working in what follows with two extreme 
values of the labor supply elasticity, a low-value equal to 0.1 and a high value equal to 0.5. It turns 
out that these two values are sufficient to illustrate the various conclusions that may be drawn from 
the analysis. Appendix 2 and 3 give more technical detail about the implementation of the preceding 
methodology to French data as well as about the datasets and the micro-simulation model being 
used.  
Several calculations have been performed. They differ depending on the definition of the 
redistribution system, the definition of individual productivities and the sample being used. The first 
definition of the redistribution system includes income taxes and assimilated contributions like the 
'Cotisation Sociale Généralisée' and all non-contributory benefits. In other words, this definition 
includes all taxes and benefits with an 'explicit' redistributive role. This is equivalent to considering 
that other taxes, including indirect taxes, which are mostly neutral with respect to consumption, are 
essentially aimed at covering non-redistributive public expenditures. Nevertheless, indirect taxes 
can be easily introduced. They would simply increase the marginal tax faced by every household.10. 
The corresponding effective marginal tax rate is referred to as 'net' in what follows, in the sense that 
it does not incorporate social contributions paid by employers or workers.  
The second definition of the redistribution system adds contribution to health insurance on the ‘tax’ 
side. In France, that contribution is levied on all labor incomes at a virtually uniform rate whereas 
the corresponding benefits - that is health insurance - may be considered,  as a first approximation, 
as being the same for the whole population and, in any case, very imperfectly related to income and 
therefore to the contribution itself.  Thus, the redistributive role of the health insurance system is 
quite substantial and is essentially due to the quasi proportionality of contributions with respect to 
income.11 By contrast, most other contributions, for instance contributions to pensions or 
unemployment insurance give rise to a delayed benefit that, in actuarial terms and as a first 
approximation, is not very different from the value of contributions. Even though actuarial 
neutrality does not really hold for these contributions, their redistributive role may be considered of 
much lesser importance than that of the health insurance contribution.12 This is what justifies the 
                                                 
10 Note, however, that the increase depends on the initial marginal tax rate. If θ is the indirect tax rate, the overall 
effective marginal tax rate becomes [t(y) +θ]/(1+θ) rather than t(y) + θ. See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, chapter 9). 
11 In effect, the health insurance system and the way it is financed may be seen as one of the most important channel for 
redistribution in France - see Rochet (1996). 
12 Another reason to ignore these contributions is that the redistribution they actually achieve is technically difficult to 
assess, mostly because of its inter-temporal nature.   
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distinction made here between the two types of contribution. The marginal tax rate associated with 
this second definition of the redistribution system that includes health insurance will be referred to 
as 'gross' below.  
Figure 1 shows the 'net' and 'gross' effective net marginal tax rates for the sub-sample of single 
workers in the 1995 French Household Survey, ranked by increasing hourly wage level. Only those 
individuals with labor income representing 90 per cent or more of total income have been selected, 
to be consistent with the fact that the optimal income tax model being used refers only to labor 
income. Focusing on singles avoids the ambiguity mentioned before in defining productivity and 
labor supply for households with multiple potential earners. Marginal tax rates are computed on the 
basis of official rules for the calculation of taxes, health insurance contributions and non-
contributory benefits, as modeled by the EUROMOD micro-simulation package (Sutherland et al., 
2001).  The figure also shows a continuous approximation to the relationship between net or gross 
marginal tax rates and individual hourly wage obtained through adaptive kernel techniques. Details 
on the calculation of the marginal effective tax rates and the application of kernel techniques can be 
found in Appendix 2. It is important to observe that there is some heterogeneity of marginal tax 
rates for low levels of the hourly wage rate. This heterogeneity reflects differences in non-wage 
characteristics of workers that affect the benefits they are entitled to - for instance their right to 
housing benefit and the size of these benefits that depend on areas of residence. Once smoothened 
through kernel techniques, the net effective marginal tax rate function, t(y), raises from 18 per cent 
at the lower end of the distribution to 36 per cent at the upper end, whereas the gross rate lies 
roughly 15 per cent above the net marginal tax rate curve.  
Figure 2 shows the estimate of the density function of the distribution of hourly wage rates, f(w), 
among single households. Two distributions are shown depending on whether the hourly wage is 
defined as net or gross of the health insurance contribution (kernel smoothing has been used). Next 
figures show the results of the optimal inverse procedure. 
The solid curves in Figure 3 show the UAMSW function S(w) derived from the density function, 
f(w), shown in figure 2, its primitive, F(w), and the continuous approximation of the  'net' marginal 
tax rate function, t(y), shown in figure 1. The horizontal axis is defined in net hourly wage 
percentiles. The top curve has been obtained under the assumption of a low labor supply elasticity, ε 
= 0.1, whereas the bottom one corresponds to the high elasticity value, ε = 0.5.  Thin curves show 
marginal social welfare by percentile of productivity, G’(V(w)) (divided by the constant λ). It is 
derived from the solid curve through expression (8) above.  The fact that the G'(.) curves are 
decreasing and above the S(.) curves is consistent with the hypothesis that G(.) is concave13. 
                                                 
13 See the discussion on condition D) in appendix 1. 
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Focusing on the UAMSW function, S(w), Figure 3 shows that it is consistent with marginal social 
welfare a) being everywhere positive, and b) declining with income.  It can also be seen that the 
UAMSW curve is everywhere lower and with a higher slope when the elasticity of labor supply 
takes the high value, 0.5. These features are fully consistent with the idea of a French redistribution 
authority that would be maximizing a well-behaved - i.e. increasing and concave - social welfare 
function. That the function seems to be more concave when the labor supply elasticity is assumed to 
be high is easy to understand. If the redistribution authority believes the labor supply elasticity is 
high and yet applies the same redistribution schedule as when it believes it is low, it means it values 
redistribution more since it is willing to accept that the same redistribution schedule lead to and a 
bigger loss in total income.  
If Figure 3 is consistent with a net redistribution system that would maximize a Paretian social 
welfare function, Figure 4 suggests that this is not the case any more when introducing health 
insurance in the redistribution system (‘gross’ marginal tax rates).  The UAMSW curve in Figure 4 
becomes negative for high levels of wage and for the high value of the labor supply elasticity. This 
phenomenon is statistically significant because it occurs much before the range of wages where the 
scarcity of observations makes any conclusion somewhat fragile because depending on the 
smoothing technique being used. It can be seen the upper average marginal social welfare S(w) 
becomes negative around the 92th percentile whereas imprecision affects the top 2 or 3 percentiles. 
The interpretation of this finding is interesting and somewhat surprising. It can be enunciated in the 
following way. “If the French redistribution authority anticipates an elasticity of labor supply 
around 0.5 or higher, then it is non-Paretian and imputes a negative marginal social welfare to 
people at the upper end of the distribution of wages.” Practically, the thin bottom curve in figure 4 
shows that marginal social welfare becomes negative for the top vintile of the population. In other 
words, social welfare would be directly increased by reducing the income of the richest 5 per cent 
of the population. The only reason why it would not be optimal to reduce it further than what is 
presently done is the loss of tax receipts and therefore the drop in transfers to the bottom part of the 
distribution that this would entail. Including also indirect taxes would reinforce this non Paretianity 
results given that in France the VAT is levied on consumption of goods mostly at a rate of 19.6%14. 
The role of the anticipations of the redistribution authority on the elasticity of labor supply must be 
underscored. The upper curves in Figure 4 show that the redistribution authority would behave in a 
fully Paretian way if it anticipated that the elasticity of the labor supply would be as low as 0.1, 
rather than 0.5. The preceding conclusion might thus be reformulated as follows: “the French 
redistribution authority is either persuaded that the elasticity of labor supply is low enough for 
relatively high marginal tax rates to be optimal in the upper range of the distribution, or it is non 
                                                 
14 Certain types of goods are taxed a different rates (2.1% and 5.5%) but their contribution to the total receipts is really 
small.  
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Paretian”. In other words, in conformity with proposition 2, we see that there exists a threshold for 
the elasticity of labor supply such that the redistribution authority is Paretian at all levels below that 
threshold.  
An interesting feature of the inversion methodology shown in the present paper is that it permits 
identifying that threshold. In the present case, a trial and error procedure showed the threshold was 
around 0.35 when using gross marginal tax rates and 0.75 when using net marginal tax rates. 
Figures 5 to 9 may be used to check whether the preceding conclusions still hold when modifying 
the way in which the distribution of productivities is being estimated and when the universe of 
income recipients is modified. Figure 5 shows the distribution of productivities obtained on single 
workers by inverting the basic labor supply model used throughout this paper with the appropriate 
wage elasticity - see (13) above. The interest of this procedure is to yield a distribution of 
productivities which is fully consistent with the method used to recover the social welfare function 
that makes the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal, rather than the distribution of hourly 
wage rates. Of course, the distribution of productivities consistent with the observed distribution of 
total labor incomes depends on the labor supply elasticity being used.  Productivities are distributed 
less equally when the elasticity is low.  Figure 6 shows the resulting estimates of the upper average 
marginal social welfare and marginal social welfare for low and high elasticity. The shape of these 
curves is the same as before with the upper average marginal social welfare becoming negative still 
around the 92th percentile when the elasticity of labor supply is high. Figures 7-9 apply the same 
technique to all households whose labor income represents 90 per cent or more of total income. 
Household of different size are being made comparable by deflating gross labor income by the 
number of adults at working age in the household. This makes the implicit productivity, w, derived 
from the inversion formula (13), a sort of average productivity among household individual 
members. Figure 7 shows the distribution of marginal tax rates among households ranked by 
productivity whereas figure 8 show the productivity distribution under the two same arbitrary 
assumptions about the elasticity of (household) labor supply as before. Finally, figure 9 shows the 
UAMSW curve (solid curves) and the corresponding marginal social welfare curves (thin curves). 
All these operations are done using the ‘gross’ definition of marginal tax rates. The same features as 
in the case of singles may be observed. Marginal social welfare is positive and declining 
everywhere for the low elasticity of labor supply. It is decreasing, with a steeper slope, for the high 
elasticity, but it is also negative in the upper part of the distribution. Moreover, the upper average 
marginal social welfare becomes negative practically at the limit of the 9th decile, slightly sooner 
than for singles. 
Obtaining the same features for singles and for all households is interesting for various reasons. As 
labor supply is certainly much more elastic at the level of the household than for single, the issue of 
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what elasticity is the most reasonable one arises with much more strength. In particular, as 
discussed at the end of section 2, it could make sense to assimilate the household elasticity of labor 
supply to the individual elasticity of so-called secondary household members – spouses, young 
children, heads close to retirement. The individual participation elasticity of the secondary earner 
becomes then the household intensive elasticity (given that there is always a first earner working 
full time). The value ε = 0.5 would thus be more likely than ε = 0.1 (see Piketty 1998 and, more 
recently, Choné et al. 2003).  On the other hand, it must be stressed that the treatment of household 
size in the optimal redistribution model is totally ignored, even though it is certainly responsible for 
differing marginal tax rates of households with the same total labor income per member at working 
age. To circumvent this problem, an alternative would be to run the inverse optimal taxation model 
on samples of households with comparable composition – i.e. couples without children, couples 
with 1 child, etc…  When doing so, it is reassuring that the same result obtains, namely negative 
upper average marginal social welfare in the upper range of productivities15.  
To conclude, it may be worth comparing the preceding conclusions to previous empirical 
application of the optimal income taxation model to French data. In those direct applications of 
Mirrlees model using individual wage rates as a measure of productivity  – d’Autume (2001), 
Salanié (1998), Piketty (1997), -  it was found that optimal marginal tax rates had a U-shape (as in 
figure 7) with the right-hand end marginal tax rate comparable to rates actually observed in the 
French redistribution system. In those models, the redistributive authority was maximizing a well-
behaved social welfare functions. Under these conditions, why is it found here that observed 
marginal tax-rates for the top of the income distribution may not always be consistent with a 
Paretian social welfare function? The answer to the preceding question relies essentially on the 
assumptions that are made about the distribution of productivities at the upper end of the 
distribution. Because of the lack of observations in that part of the income range – or more exactly 
the distance at which top observations are from each other – it is extremely difficult to obtain 
satisfactory continuous approximations of the distribution.  
A very common assumption consists of assuming that the distribution can be approximated there by 
a Pareto. For example, Piketty (1997, 2001) makes that assumption for the very top incomes of the 
French distribution and finds that the best fit is offered by a Pareto with coefficient a = 2.1.  With 
such a value and ε = 0.5, the condition for the Paretianity of revealed social preferences as given by 
(10) is that the marginal tax rate is below 58.8%, a value that is indeed slightly above the maximum 
gross marginal tax rate observed in the case of France which in our sample turns out to be 57 per 
cent. It turns out that the Pareto coefficient estimated for the top part of the distribution in our 
                                                 
15 These results are available upon request. 
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sample is superior to 2.5 whatever the percentile at which the original distribution is replaced by a 
Pareto16. With such a value of the Pareto parameter non Paretianity holds. 
Estimating the shape of the distribution of the productivity will always be difficult and imprecise at 
the very top of the distribution. However the important feature of the previous results is that the 
negativity of S(w) occurs much below the range in which the density and the cumulative of the 
productivity distribution are imperfectly known. This is either because the Pareto shape does not fit 
that part of the distribution, or because the parameter a is larger than some threshold. We asked the 
French National Statistic Institute (INSEE) to perform the estimations and to provide us with the 
estimates of the Pareto parameter using a more numerous and more precise survey based on income 
tax returns: the “Survey on the Fiscal Incomes 1996” 17. The estimations yielded values of a in the 
interval [2.9-3.2] reinforcing our non Paretianity result when the elasticity of labor supply is high 
enough.  
4. Income Effects 
The inclusion of income effects influences the Non Paretianity results. With preferences represented 
by a function of the following type: U(c, L) = A(c) – B(L) (where A(c) is not supposed to be linear 
anymore) it may be shown that the optimal taxation formula (4) becomes: 
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Proposition 4. A necessary condition for the social welfare function that makes the observed 
effective marginal tax rate schedule, t(w), optimal with respect to the observed distribution of 
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16 As in the case of the Kernel, we interpolate the density using an unbounded Pareto distribution. 
17 In French: “Enquête sur les Revenus Fiscaux 1996”. We thank Pascal Chevalier and Alexandre Baclet from the 
French National Statistic Institute (INSEE) for accepting to perform the estimations and for providing us with these 
figures. 
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This is the equivalent of  (9) when income effects are considered. By comparing (9) and (15) we 
can easily see that, as [ ][ ] 1)w(c
)w(c ≥ψ
ψ , the right hand side of (9) is always smaller that the 
corresponding term in (15). This implies that the inclusion of income effect mitigates the possibility 
to be Non Paretian. Results of the computation of S(w) obtained using 
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− )1( ) are presented in Figure 10 for the 
sample of French singles, using the gross wages as a proxy of the productivities, with the following 
two sets of parameters values (α = 2, β = 2) and (α = 5, β = 5/7) both leading to  ε = 0.5 but with 
different marginal utilities of income18. It may be seen that, in both cases, the upper incomplete 
mean marginal social welfare, S(w), became negative only beyond the 95th centile. These empirical 
results show that the non-Paretian nature of the social welfare function in presence of a medium 
value for the elasticity of labor supply is influenced by the presence of income effects. 
5. Taking into account explicitly participation decisions: the Saez model  
The Mirrlees approach builds on a labor supply model which only focuses on hours-of-work 
responses. More realistic labor supply model, incorporating labor market participation responses, 
can provide some quite different results in optimal income taxation19. To check to what extent this 
is an important assumption and to contrast welfare weights in the standard intensive elasticity 
scenario with a scenario with participation effects we now present the results of the inversion of an 
optimal tax problem à la Saez (2002) where extensive and intensive labor supply behaviors are 
explicitly taken into account in an optimal labor income taxation model.  
Saez (2002) sets up a discrete optimal tax problem conceptually very similar to the one described 
above with the particularity of differentiating explicitly the labor supply decisions (how much to 
work) from the participation decisions (working or not).  In his model there are I+1 groups in the 
labor market: I groups of individuals who do work (ranked by increasing earnings from 1 to I) plus 
one group consisting of those who do not work (group 0). Individuals choose whether or not to 
participate (the extensive margin), and which group to choose (the intensive margin). In this 
framework, optimal taxation has the following form [see Saez (2002) for a formal derivation]: 
                                                 
18 To compute the terms [ ])w(cψ  and [ ])w(cψ  in formula (14) we used the observed disposable income as proxy 
for the optimal consumption c. 
19 In the original Mirrlees (1971) formulation, there is a threshold skill level under which individuals do not work. This 
implies that the intensive elasticity at the bottom is infinite. Therefore, there is an element of labor force participation in 
the intensive model of Mirrlees (1971). But the labor force participation choice is only between unemployment and an 
infinitesimal amount of work. This feature is not empirically realistic, because of fixed costs of work. 
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In this expression, Φ is the exogenous government financial constraint, Ti is net tax paid by group i 
and Ci is the net household income of this group. The term on the left-hand side is the discrete 
equivalent of the marginal tax rate, i.e. the extra tax paid when moving from group i-1 to i divided 
by the gain in net income. Non-workers receive benefits -T0, by definition identical to C0. Gross 
earnings within group i, Yi, equal to Ci + Ti, are supposed to be fixed. hi measures the share of group 
i in the population. The social welfare function is summarized by gi, the marginal weight the 
government assigns to group i. This weight represents the value (expressed in terms of public funds) 
of giving an additional euro to an individual in group i. Alternatively, one can say that the 
government is indifferent between giving one more euro to an individual in occupation i and getting 
gi more euros of public funds. It is equivalent to λ
(.)G  (eq. 8) in the standard Mirrlees setup. The 
intensive elasticity, µi, is defined as: 
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This mobility elasticity captures the percentage increase in the number of agents in group i when Ci-
Ci-1 is increased by 1%, and is defined under the assumption that individuals are restricted to adjust 
their labor supply to the neighboring group. Note that, as shown in Saez (2002), this intensive 
elasticity is related with the classical labor supply elasticity εi in the Mirrlees model by the 
following relationship: i
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i
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Y εμ
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Finally, χi is a measure of the extensive elasticity, and is defined as the percentage of individuals in 
group i who stops working when the difference between the net household income out of work and 
at earnings point i is reduced by 1%: 
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The main implication of the optimal tax rule above is that the optimal tax system depends heavily 
on whether labor supply responses are concentrated at the intensive or extensive margin.  
As with the Mirrlees model, it is possible to invert the model in order to reveal the social 
preferences about inequality (i.e. the term gi). From equation (16) we obtain that: 
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and, given that the group I is the last one in the population of workers: 
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Equations (20) and (21), jointly with the normalizing condition 1
0
=∑
=
I
i
ii gh
20, allows us to compute 
recursively, from the observation of Ti, Ci, hi, μi and χi  for each i = I, I-1,…0, the marginal weights 
gi that the government assigns to each class of agents.  
It is easy to see (Saez 2002) that, when the elasticity of participation χi tends to zero, then equations 
(20) and (21) reduce to a discrete version of equation (8) and then all the results previously obtained 
still hold. It is also immediate to see that, in the classical intensive labor supply framework (i.e. χi = 
0), the condition of Paretianity of the social welfare function (i.e. the equivalent of proposition 1) 
for the last group of agent (the group I) is, by equation (21): 
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and then that there exists a threshold for the intensive elasticity of labor supply below which the 
social welfare function is necessarily non-decreasing everywhere (proposition 2). 
When the elasticity of participation χi is positive, the possibility to be non Paretian (i.e. gi ≤ 0) 
increases given that the terms 
0
0
CC
TT
j
j
j −
−− χ  are negative (see equation 20). 
For comparability with Saez (2002), we first report the results on a sample of singles aged 18 to 65, 
in which students and individuals with non-labor income above 10 per cent of total income are 
eliminated from the sample. The final sample used in this exercise contains 1028 singles (963 
working). The rate of nonlabor force participation (zero yearly earnings reported) for this group is 
around 9 percent.  We present only the case in which the redistribution system is the “gross” (as 
defined in the previous section. We have defined a discrete grid of eleven income levels Yi trying to 
obtain the same frequency hi in each class. Table 1 gives the statistics of our sample. Following the 
discussion in section 3, about the elasticity parameters summarizing the behavioral responses, we 
present simulations using 3 ranges of parameter values (see Table 2). Three main groups of 
scenarios are simulated: no participation effects (scenarios A and B), medium participation 
elasticity (scenarios C, D, E and F) and high participation elasticity (scenarios G, H, I and L). In 
particular, the values for the participation elasticity χ is taken as constant and equal to 0, 0.5 or 1 for 
                                                 
20 Note that, as shown in Saez (2002) this condition holds only if income effects are ruled out. 
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incomes below 75000 francs (i.e. until group 2) per year and equal to 0 for the rest of the population 
because it is certainly small for middle and higher income earners.  
In order to compare these new results with the previous one, all simulations are presented in terms 
of the intensive labor supply elasticity from the standard model which is denoted by ε. The 
intensive elasticity ε for incomes below 75000 francs per year is taken as constant and equal to 0, 
0.1 or 0.5. The middle and high income (above 75000 francs) elasticity is taken as constant and 
equal to 0.1 or 0.5. All simulations have been carried out assuming no income effects.  
Figure 11 shows the social marginal weights computed in a complete intensive labor supply 
framework (i.e. χ = 0), with average ε = 0.1 (scenario A) and 0.5 (scenario B) (the values of gi are 
reported in columns A and B of table 3). As expected, the same qualitative results are found as in 
the standard Mirrlees framework (Figure 4). In particular, with high intensive elasticities (scenario 
B), we obtain negative social marginal weights for the upper part of the income distribution (last 
decile).   
Table 3 reports the social marginal weights associated to each income group under different 
scenarios (negative weights are in bold).  The inclusion of medium participation effects (scenarios 
C, D, E, and F) does not change qualitatively the results obtained in a classical intensive labor 
supply model à la Mirrlees.  The non-Paretianity results are limited to the upper class of incomes 
and under the hypothesis of high intensive labor supply reactions. On the contrary, including high 
participation effects (χi = 1), implies revealing negative marginal weights not only for the upper part 
of the workers population but also for the first category of workers (i =1) (see scenarios G, H, I, L). 
Again it must be underscored that this conclusion depends on the prior that the redistribution 
authority has about the participation elasticity. In practice, participation elasticity bigger than 0.5 
are extremely implausible for sample of singles (there is no empirical evidence, at the moment 
supporting such a scenario neither in France nor in other countries)21. On the contrary, looking at 
the results of the empirical literature on discrete choice model of labor supply (see in particular 
Piketty 1998) values of participation elasticity higher than 0.5 are observed for the so-called 
secondary household members (in particular women with children). Probably the best way to 
incorporate the big size participation elasticity of the 2nd earner in a household income tax model 
(where household are considered as an agent) is to treat it as an intensive elasticity given that there 
is always a first earner working full time. This is what we have done in the section 3. Alternatively 
it would be necessary to write down a model of household income taxation explicitly accounting for 
both spouses participation but this is out of the scope of this paper (see Kleven et al. 2006).  
                                                 
21 It must be also stressed that revealing non decreasing social marginal weights implies the violation of the concavity 
conditions on the social welfare function and then the impossibility to ensure that the observed redistribution policy is 
consistent with a maximizing behavior.  
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The results of this section are in line with the ones obtained by Saez (2002), Laroque (2005) and 
Blundell et al. (2006). In his simulations on US data, Saez (2002) shows that a Negative Income 
Tax program with a large guaranteed income level which is taxed away at high rates (as the French 
Minimum Income Guaranteed Scheme –RMI-) it is never optimal when participation elasticities are 
high and the social welfare function is increasing and concave everywhere. In that case, an Earning 
Tax Credit implying negative marginal tax rates on the low ability agents (class 1) is optimal. In our 
simulation, we show that, with high participation elasticities, a redistribution system with positive 
and very high marginal tax rate at the bottom of the income distribution (as it is the case for the 
RMI) can be candidate to be optimal only if the social planner is Non Paretian. 
Blundell et al. (2006) perform analogous simulations on a sample of lone mothers in Germany and 
UK, using elasticities (both intensive and of participation) estimated econometrically with values 
corresponding to our low-medium scenarios (from 0 to 0.2 in Germany and from 0 to 0.5 in UK). 
They find patterns of social marginal weights very similar to ours. 
Laroque (2005) computes the Laffer bound in France (e.g. and the revenue maximizing and 
efficiency cost minimizing tax system under Paretian specification of social preferences) and 
compare it with the 1999 French tax system. He finds that the French system is on the left of the 
Laffer bounds. This implies that French tax policy is Rawlsian, so that Laroque's results also 
become a statement about the social preferences implied by observed tax policy. In terms of our 
results, this means that, among the scenarios we simulated, the most plausible are the low elasticity 
ones. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has explored an original side of applied optimal taxation. Instead of deriving the optimal 
marginal tax rate curve associated with some distribution of individual productivities, the paper 
offers a set of optimality conditions that the observed marginal tax rate must respects in order to be 
compatible with the maximization of a concave social welfare function and derives conditions for 
the revealed social welfare function be Paretian (i.e. increasing everywhere).  
The detailed empirical analysis performed on France shows that the observed marginal tax rate is in 
agreement with standard optimal tax theory and that the revealed social welfare function is 
increasing and concave when the elasticity of labor supply is assumed to be low and when the 
redistribution system excludes the health insurance contributions. Marginal social welfare then is 
both positive and decreasing throughout the range of individual productivities. However, marginal 
social welfare turns out to be negative at the very top of the distribution when the labor supply 
elasticity is assumed to be around the average of estimates available for secondary workers in the 
literature, and the health insurance contribution is included in the redistribution system. Taking 
explicitly into account participation decisions confirms the result that high marginal tax rates are 
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compatible with the maximization of a Paretian social welfare function only if the labor supply 
elasticities are low.   
Two lessons may be drawn from all this exercise. The first sheds some doubt about the idea that the 
real world is as if a redistribution authority were maximizing some Paretian social welfare function. 
It was found in this paper that its behavior could be of three different types. Either the redistribution 
authority takes it that labor supply responses to taxation are low, or it has non-Paretian social 
preferences (and there is then space for a Pareto improving tax changes), or it does not optimize at 
all. This conclusion is not really surprising. To some extent, the last two cases, which seem the 
most likely, are even reassuring. Indeed, tax-benefit schedules in the real world might result more 
from political economy forces than from the pursuit of some well defined social objective. They 
may also reflect various other constraints that policy makers face (e.g., that real-world tax systems 
for practical reasons have to be piecewise linear). 
The second lesson is the practical interest of reading actual tax-benefit systems through the social 
preferences that they reveal.  It is customary to discuss and evaluate reforms in tax-benefit systems 
in terms of how they would affect some 'typical households' and more rarely what their implications 
are for the whole distribution, of disposable income.  The instrument developed in this paper offers 
another interesting perspective. By drawing marginal social welfare curves consistent with a tax-
benefit system before and after reforms, it is possible to characterize in a more precise way the 
distributional bias of the reform. 
 
Appendix 1. The optimum inverse problem.  
All the results in section 1 are based on the hypothesis that the observed marginal tax rate is the 
result of maximization of a social welfare function with the budget and the incentive compatibility 
constraints. This assumption imposes several restrictions on the shape of the observed marginal tax 
rate that, if not satisfied make the whole inversion procedure inconsistent. Let see them in details. 
First we have to ensure that an observed marginal tax rate t(y) is consistent with an agent 
maximizing behavior and that the individual utility function chosen fulfills the Spence-Mirrlees 
condition (this condition ensure that the first order approach to the incentive compatibility 
constraint is sufficient, see Ebert 1992). The conditions to be checked are: 
A) 1)y(t <  for any w (from the f.o.c. of problem 1.2); 
B)  
[ ]
c
2
2
ccLL
Uw
))y(t1(wUU)y('t −+>   for any w  (from the s.o.c. of problem 1.2); 
C) 0>∂
∂
w
C  without taxes; this is the Spence-Mirrlees condition. 
Second, we have to ensure that the observed t(y) is consistent with the solution of an optimization 
problem à la Mirrlees. Let start by rewriting the original optimization problem (1) as an optimal 
control problem– see also Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), p. 415. Using the utility function (2), the 
correspondent Hamiltonian is: 
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w
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where L(w) is the control variable, V(w) is the state variable, λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated 
to constraint (1.4) and μ(w) is the co-state variable associated to the first order incentive 
compatibility constraint )L(B
w
L
w
)w(V
L=∂
∂  (an alternative way to rewrite constraints 1.2 and 1.3) 
The Pontryagin Maximum principle states that the following first order conditions are necessary: 
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Consolidating the two and making use of the f.o.c of problem (1.2) we obtain the condition (4) on 
the marginal tax rate t(y). 
It is well-known (for the Mangasarian theorem) that the Pontryagin Maximum Principle that leads 
to the optimality conditions (p. foc 1) and (p.foc 2) are necessary and sufficient provided that H(.) is 
differentiable and concave in the variables (L,V) jointly. Given that in our case H is separable in 
(L,V), the Mangasarian theorem implies that: 
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∂
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G  (e.g. the concavity of social welfare function. It ensures the concavity of the 
Hamiltonian with respect to V).  
and 
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∂ ; it ensures the concavity of the Hamiltonian with 
respect to the control variable L). 
The empirical tests of conditions A, B and C are immediate. Note that with U(c,L) isoelastic and 
quasi-linear in consumption Ucc=0 and Uc=1 then condition B) can be rewritten as:  ( )
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The Spence-Mirrlees condition C) is always satisfied with the U(.) chosen. 
The empirical test of condition D) is based on the 'curvature' of the density function f(w) and on the 
derivatives of the marginal tax rate t(y) (see appendix 4 for a formal derivation). As only a limited 
precision can be empirically obtained on these functions this approach will not be pursued in this 
paper. A much simpler test on the concavity of the social welfare function can be easily 
implemented by an inspection of the shape of the G’(V(w)) computed as in (8) when plotted on w. If 
it is everywhere decreasing then we can easily prove that 0
V
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∂  is always positive.  This is the basic concavity test we will 
follows.     
With U(c,L) iso-elastic and quasi-linear in consumption, the condition E) becomes 
)w(wf
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+<  . Using (p.foc 2), it can be written as  )w(F1
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ε  . Then, using 
(7), he reduces to: 
)y(t1
)y(t1 −<−  that is always satisfied if  0 ≤ t(y) ≤ 1. Note that if conditions A), 
B) and C) are satisfied, condition E is automatically satisfied given that ensuring the compatibility 
of the marginal tax rate with the maximizing behavior of any agent means that the tax scheme is 
incentive compatible. 
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Appendix 2. Technicalities.  
Equation (7) yields the basic principle of the inversion methodology. Its actual implementation 
raises additional complications, however. They are listed below together with the choices made to 
overcome them. 
a) Continuity and differentiability 
The application of the inverted optimal taxation formulae, (7)-(8), requires the knowledge of the 
continuous functions f(w), t(y) and their derivatives. As just discussed, above, however, what may 
be obtained from households data bases is a set of discrete observations of the imputed productivity 
characteristic, wi, the associated cumulative distribution function, F(wi) and the marginal tax rate 
function, t(yi) The following operations permit to smooth those functions and to get estimates of 
their derivatives.  
(i) For any arbitrary value of productivity, w, obtain an estimate of the density function f(W) and the 
effective marginal tax rate t(wL) by kernel techniques defined over the whole sample of 
observations - using a Gaussian kernel with an adaptive window. These Kernel approximations are 
made necessary first by the need to switch from a discrete to a continuous representation of the 
distribution and the tax schedule and second by the heterogeneity of the population with respect to 
some characteristics that may influence marginal tax rates and productivity estimates - household 
composition, for instance22.  
(ii) Estimate the derivatives of t(y) and f(w) using again a kernel approximation computed over the 
whole sample.23 
(iii) Compute the elasticity of t(y) and f(w) (i.e. the terms )(/)(')( wfwwfw =η  and 
)y(t/)y('yt)y( =ν ). 
(iv) Compute the function G’(w) as in (8) and the function S(w) as in (7). 
b) The Adaptive Nadaraya- Watson kernel  
For a theoretical explanation see Silverman (1986) and Pagan and Ullah (1999). The adaptive 
kernel techniques allow to compute, starting from a set of pair wise observations xi and yi(xi), a one-
dimensional kernel density f(xi) and a kernel estimation ŷ(xi) of  yi(xi).  
In our case xi = wi and yi(xi) = t(wiLi).   
Let 
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Silverman 1989).  The kernel actually used is a modified Gaussian  
( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−=− 2)(exp ixxhixxhK  
where   2
2.0
2
n
*06.1
1
dowoptimalwin
1h
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
==
x)deviation( standard
  as in Hardle (1991) pag 91. 
Define now the local bandwidth factor: 
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and α is a sensitivity parameter for the adaptive bandwidth taking values from 0 to 1. Near 0 it 
reproduces the normal kernel. Near 1 is high adaptive. The value used in our simulations is 0.5 
(following Silverman 1986). The Adaptive Nadaraya – Watson kernel estimator is: 
                                                 
22 Occupational status and home ownership are other sources of heterogeneity with respect to the tax system.  
23 For technical details about the computations of kernel derivatives see Pagan and Ullah (1999,  pag. 164). 
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Kernels Derivatives (see: Pagan and Ullah 1999) 
Let 
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In order to adjust the windows for the kernel estimation of derivatives (e.g. the optimal window for 
derivatives is not the optimal window for the primitive kernel), we use the following formula for the 
optimal window of s-order derivative (on the subject see Pagan and Ullah 1999 pag 56-57): 
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c) Households with zero income and households with apparently irrational behavior 
In presence of a guaranteed minimum income in a tax-benefit system, some households may find it 
optimal not to work at all. In the simple labor supply model above, this would correspond to a 
situation where the marginal tax rate is 100 percent. However, there is some ambiguity about these 
situations. Practically, some households are observed in pats of their budget constraint where the 
marginal tax rate is indeed 100 percent. There are two possible reasons for this. First, transitory 
situations may be observed where households have not yet converged towards their preferred 
consumption-labor combination.  Second, transition periods are allowed by tax-benefit systems 
where beneficiaries of minimum income schemes may cumulate that transfer and labor income for 
some time so as to smoothen out the income path on return to activity.   
The example of the French minimum income program (RMI) suggests the following way of 
handling the 100 marginal tax rate issue. People receiving the minimum income RMI and taking up 
a job lose only 50 percent of additional labor income during a so-called 'intéressement' period – 18 
months. At the end of that period, however, they would lose all of it if they wanted to keep 
benefiting from the RMI. Discounting over time, this means that the actual marginal tax rate on the 
labor income of a 'RMIste' is between 50 and 100 percent. Taking the middle of that interval, the 
budget constraint of that person thus writes:  y = RMI + .25* wL  if this person qualifies for the 
RMI –i.e. wL<RMI. But it is simply:  y = wL  if  wL > RMI24. This budget constraint is clearly 
convex.  Therefore, there should be a range of labor incomes around the RMI where it would be 
irrational to be25. But, of course, some households are actually observed in that range, which is 
                                                 
24 All other benefits that may complement the RMI are ignored in this argument, but they are taken into account in the 
calculations made. 
25 This interval may easily be computed using the preference function of households and the budget constraint described 
by the preceding conditional system. Note that it depends on the size and the socio-demographics characteristics of each 
household. 
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inconsistent with the model being used and/or the assumption made on the marginal tax rate 
associated with the RMI. One way of dealing with this inconsistency is to assume that all gross 
labor incomes are observed with some measurement error drawn from some arbitrary distribution. 
The measurement error is such that, without it, households would be rational and supply a quantity 
of labor outside the preceding range. This treatment of the data is analogous to the original 
econometric model describing the labor supply behavior of households facing a non-linear and 
possibly discontinuous budget constraint by Hausman (1985). 
Appendix 3. Microsimulation model, dataset and data treatment.  
The sample and the microsimulation model were taken from EUROMOD, a project whose objective 
is to build an integrated micro simulation model for the 15 countries of the European Community. 
A complete and detailed description of the EUROMOD micro simulation model as well as the 
datasets is contained in Sutherland (2001). The version of the model used in this paper is a 
prototype replicating the laws enforced in 1995 in France. All the modules replicate social 
contributions levied on wages (for employers and employees) and on self-employed workers; social 
contributions on other types of income (unemployment benefits, income from pensions and capital 
return); income taxes; family benefits and social assistance mechanisms. The datasets used for 
France are the 1995 Households Budget Survey of INSEE. The micro simulation model has been 
used in order to compute the effective marginal tax rate for each household. This variable was 
obviously not present in the survey and it was therefore necessary to compute it. The definition of 
effective marginal tax rate used was the derivative, in each point, of the budget constraint. A 
possible method of calculation consists of the assignment of a lump-sum amount of gross income to 
each household (in our case the equivalent of 5000 French francs per household per year) and, in 
the computation with the micro-simulation model, of a new distribution of disposable incomes. The 
effective marginal rate of taxation is thus obtained from the formula:  
y
Yd
ncomeGross
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Δ−=Δ
Δ+Δ= 1
I 
      
To keep with the logic of the optimal taxation model, all households with zero income and with 
non-labor income, including pension and unemployment benefits above 10 per cent of total income 
were eliminated from the sample. The final samples used in the paper contain 5527 households (on 
a total of 10214), 963 of which are singles.   
Appendix 4. On the concavity of the social welfare function.  
We can show differentiating (8) with respect to w that:  
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The concavity of G(V) implies that  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0y)y(zˆ1)w(1ˆ1ˆ1)w(1)y(t1y ˆ1)y()y(z1V(.)G fw2
2
<⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −++++−
+
+=∂
∂ εησε
εηεφε
ε
λ    (23) 
In the particular case in which f(w) is distributed as a Pareto with parameter a, it is easily shown that 
aw −−= 1)(η  and af −−= 2σ .  
It follows that (23) becomes:  
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Notice that when the marginal tax rate is increasing, that is for high incomes, z(y) is positive. Then, 
in that case, condition (24) is verified if: ( )( )
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If the preceding conditions (23) or (24) are not satisfied, the revealed social welfare function would 
be convex, which makes the whole optimum inverse procedure irrelevant. This result extends the 
one obtained by Diamond (1998) because it restraints the class of U shaped marginal tax rates 
(consistent with an increasing average tax rate) consistent with a non convex social welfare 
function. 
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Table 1. Sample statistics 
I Yi Ci Ti hi F(Y) 
0 0 12000 -12000 0,09 9% 
1 48857 35919 12939 0,08 17% 
2 74340 54398 19942 0,09 26% 
3 91116 64926 26190 0,09 35% 
4 105954 73144 32811 0,09 44% 
5 121247 80750 40497 0,09 53% 
6 135790 87779 48011 0,09 63% 
7 152870 95747 57122 0,09 72% 
8 175352 106173 69179 0,09 81% 
9 215857 123988 91869 0,09 90% 
10 408454 217915 190539 0,10 100% 
 
Table 2. Elasticity parameters retained in the simulations. 
Scenarios 
(elasticities) 
 A B C D E 
χ ε χ ε χ ε χ ε χ ε 
0 0.1 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.5 i= 0, 1, 2 classes 
of 
income 0 0.1 0 0.5 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 i= 3-10  
 
Scenarios 
(elasticities) 
 F G H I L 
χ ε χ ε χ ε χ ε χ ε 
0.5 0.5 1 0 1 0.1 1 0.5 1 0.5 i= 0, 1, 2 classes 
of 
income 0 0.5 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.5 i= 3-10  
 
Table 3. Social marginal weights (gi) associated to each income group under different scenarios. 
 No participation effects 
Medium participation 
elasticity 
High participation 
elasticity 
i F(Y) A B C D E F G H I L 
0 9% 1,13 1.63 1,88 2,01 2,52 2,52 2,76 2,89 3,40 3,40 
1 17% 0,92 1.14 0,48 0,40 0,08 0,08 -0,04 -0,12 -0,44 -0,44 
2 26% 1,28 1.72 0,95 0,90 0,70 1,99 0,57 0,53 0,33 1,61 
3 35% 1,11 1.72 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,56 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,56 
4 44% 1,12 1.57 1,12 1,12 1,12 1,57 1,12 1,12 1,12 1,57 
5 53% 1,03 1.13 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,13 1,03 1,03 1,03 1,13 
6 63% 1,05 1.22 1,05 1,05 1,05 1,22 1,05 1,05 1,05 1,22 
7 72% 1,01 1.05 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,05 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,05 
8 81% 1,06 1.28 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,28 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,28 
9 90% 0,95 0.73 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,73 0,95 0,95 0,95 0,73 
10 100% 0,42 -1.84 0,42 0,42 0,42 -1,84 0,42 0,42 0,42 -1,84 
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Figure 1. Kernel smoothed marginal tax rates for singles: net and 
gross scenarios
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Figure 3. Social marginal welfare for singles (on net wages)
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Figure 4. Social marginal welfare for singles (on gross wages)
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Figure 2. Kernel wage densities for singles: net and gross scenario
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Figure 5. Kernel productivity densities for singles
f(productivities; e=0.5)
f(productivities; e=0.1)
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
m
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
w
e
l
f
a
r
e
productivity quantiles
Figure 6. Social marginal welfare for singles (on productivities)
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Figure 8. Kernel productivity densities for all households
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Figure 7. Gross kernel smoothed marginal tax rates for all 
households
t(w) original t(w) kernel
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Figure 9. Social marginal welfare for all household (on 
productivities)
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Figure 10. Paretianity test on social marginal welfare for singles (on 
gross wages) with income effects
S(w) alfa =2; beta = 2
S(w) alfa =5; beta = 5/7
 
 
